Freedom and necessity in rationality of human cognition as expression of its potential and limits

Tyumen State University Herald. Humanities Research. Humanitates


Vesntik TSU. Philosophy. 2013

Freedom and necessity in rationality of human cognition as expression of its potential and limits

About the author:

Mikhail N. Shcherbinin,
Dr. Philos. Sci., Professor, Department of Philosophy, Institute for the Humanities, Tyumen State University


The article under consideration reviews potential and limits of
rationality in human cognition through the example of freedom phenomenon. Particularly,
experience of rationalistic explanation of freedom and necessity dialectical unity is
under investigation. At the same time, the question of reason and mind involvement
in the phenomenon of freedom brings the investigation out of the scope of proper
human cognition into the sphere of «live» human interaction, to the domain of behavior,
aspirations, hope and imagination. The article demonstrates that development of
the common in vital activity of the extending human race requires generalization
of aspirations, goals, hopes and dreams of a number of various individuals through
freedom. Simultaneously, a conclusion is made not only about «activating» the mechanism of already direct «necessity of freedom», but also about the danger of cross-cutting
subordination of the mechanism to public and bureaucratic establishments.
The article concerns disintegration of philosophic and world-view integrity of the
contemporary humanities knowledge; the power balance significance; necessity and
freedom in a human being as an object of the humanities; necessity to the freedom
of creative investigations. In addition discussion is suggested; it deals with figural
principles of existence of the common and generalizes in the form of human freedom
phenomenon, having been well-illustrated in historical aspect.
A conclusion is made about requirement for building the position of self-critical
rationalism in the human science. Such a position allows accomplishing dialectical unity
not only as regards the necessary and occasional, the occasional and regular, but also
the sought-for unity of creative liberty and moral responsibility.