About the authors:
Vladimir A. Davydenko, Dr. Sci. (Soc.), Professor, Head of the Research Center, Institute of Finance and Economics, University of Tyumen; email@example.com
; ORCID: 0000-0001-8389-4254
Elena P. Danilova, Cand. Sci. (Soc.), Associate Professor, Department of Management and Business, University of Tyumen; firstname.lastname@example.org
; ORCID: 0000-0002-8254-2342
Sergey V. Danilov, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Management, Marketing and Logistics, Tyumen State University; email@example.com
The article analyses the results of empirical and statistical analysis in the sphere of mortgage and housing amid Russian slumping economy. The analysis is carried out in terms of modern economical and sociological theory using political-cultural and power-oriented approaches. The paper considers institutional traps in modern Russia taken in socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts.
The scientific problem of the article is the contradictions arising in the sphere of mortgage and housing considered in terms of institutional traps (lock-in effect) which are understood as inefficient (from the public benefit point of view) social norms of self-sustaining and steady character. From the theoretical point of view, the problem is solved interdisciplinary: in terms of economic sociology, financial behavior, bank solution, and macroeconomics in the context of social embeddedness of creditors and borrowers’ economic behavior.
The purpose of the article is to find answers to the main theoretical question: why do modern monetary, mortgage and credit markets fail to stabilize “cost of goods”. There are some interesting challenge problems: identification of the intrinsic, semantic and substantial moments of the modern monetary, mortgage and credit markets which reflect relation types as they are based on. The article’s applicability is caused by the emerging problem of social defaults. It means that borrowers cannot pay on loans. The applicability is also caused by bankruptcies growth, the bankruptcy law of natural persons in Russia coming into effect since October 1, 2015, and the settlement of the insolvent citizen debts.
The article shows the “scissors” of increasing debt on the mortgage housing loans and stable quantity of the issued ruble mortgage loans. It means that institutional traps in mortgage and housing work in Russian slumping economy on macro, meso and micro levels.